My MRP on SMA3 was finally published in Brock University\u2019s Digital Repository, I\u2019m proud to share my Major Research Project (MRP) for my Master of Education in Administration and Leadership<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I started my comparative analysis of Ontario Universities 2017\u20132020 Strategic Mandate Agreement (SMA2) documents because I felt that so many measures were obtuse and used baselines and targets that were relative to information that could not be accessed externally, greatly diminishing the public accountability the SMA process purported to facilitate. My assumption was simply seeing these 244 institutional targets and metrics (228 unique) would demonstrate this. This led to a directed reading and this blog. College metrics for SMA2 were always more standardized and the metrics chosen better reflected well-known PSE measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n My MRP was intended to serve as a form of handbook for the Ontario SMA3 process, again primarily focussing on the university sector, but taking advantage of the closer alignment to the College program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This SMA3 Handbook blog series<\/a> will look at all 10 metrics in a way that better matches the format, but if you\u2019d prefer an analysis based on Schneider and Ingram\u2019s (1993)<\/a> social construction of target populations<\/em>, then I recommend this 173-page PDF<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n My research discussed the 2020\u20132025 SMA3\u2019s 10 new Performance-Based Funding (PBF) metrics that will govern up to 60% of provincial transfers to universities and colleges. SMA3 also introduced an institutionally allocated metric weighing scheme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PBF is a growing trend in PSE funding. There are existing PBF models available to compare Ontario\u2019s new metrics against, and experience with PBF in practice for funding teaching and research across the United States and some research funding models in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PBF has been implemented in other jurisdictions as a tool for the strategic allocation of funding in the service of neoliberal new public management (NPM) conceptions of accountability for both public funds spent and the actions of public institutions in the service of political leadership (Dougherty & Natow, 2020<\/a>). The primary justification for PBF PSE funding is the efficiency of existing funds rather than adding funds to PSE systems (Adam, 2020<\/a>; Dougherty & Natow, 2020<\/a>). As described in the 2020\u20132025 Strategic Mandate Agreement Template, Ontario\u2019s implementation tasks the institutions themselves with the responsibility to negotiate targets for each of the 10 metrics with MCU and then meet them (MCU, 2020, as cited in Ryerson University, 2020<\/a>; see also University of Windsor, 2020<\/a>). Research on the application of PBF in other jurisdictions suggests that there can be both positive and negative effects, and that much relies on the institutions\u2019 performance, as intended, but also on what metrics are adopted and how they are measured and administrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most attribute the motivation for adopting PBF to neoliberal ideologies<\/a>, such as NPM and its accountability objectives, within this ideology. As a result, negative impacts of PBF are expected and seen as a cause for regular revision, not a fatal flaw of PBF or performance management (Adam, 2020; Dougherty & Natow, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Alberta was the first province in Canada to adopt a PBF model for PSE in the 1990s by allocating small strategic funding envelopes that were competitively awarded, with the performance component representing 5% of overall sector funding in the 1990s and for some institutions it was as high as 20% (Barnetson, 1999<\/a>). A report commissioned by Alberta\u2019s Minister of Advanced Education in 2005 placed system-wide funding related to the competitive performance envelope at 2% (Alberta Advanced Education, 2005). Ontario is the first province to consider transitioning from a majority enrolment-based funding model to a predominantly PBF model. Previously, under the SMA2 model, only 4% of the 2017\u20132019 funding model in Ontario was based on performance (MTCU, 2015). Alberta subsequently announced its intent to implement a base PBF model that could account for as much as 40% of funding in response to recommendations from the 2019 MacKinnon Report on Alberta\u2019s Finances recommendations (Government of Alberta, 2020<\/a>). Manitoba\u2019s premier is considering a Tennessee-influenced PBF model (Froese, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n My research found that metrics created for SMA3 are justified only by their adherence to neoliberal new public management objectives; not PBF literature. SMA3 fails to incorporate established mitigations against access bias while introducing the risk of untested and ideologically motivated metrics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Adam, Edmund. \u201c\u2018Governments Base Performance-Based Funding on Global Rankings Indicators\u2019: A Global Trend in Higher Education Finance or a Global Rankings Literature Fiction? A Comparative Analysis of Four Performance-Based Funding Programs.\u201d International Journal of Educational Development<\/em> 76 (2020): 102197-. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.ijedudev.2020.102197<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Alberta Advanced Education. \u201cAdvanced Education: A Cross-Jurisdictional Overview of Accessibility, Affordability and Quality.\u201d Edmonton, AB: Alberta Advanced Education, 2005.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Barnetson, Robert J. \u201cA Review of Alberta\u2019s Performance-Based Funding Mechanism.\u201d Quality in Higher Education<\/em> 5, no. 1 (1999): 37\u201350. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/1353832990050104<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Clare, Matt. \u201cExploring Ontario Universities\u2019 Strategic Mandate Agreements\u2019 New Performance-Based Model in Relation to SMA\u2019s Original Differentiation Goals.\u201d Brock University, 2021. http:\/\/hdl.handle.net\/10464\/15139<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dougherty, Kevin J., and Rebecca S. Natow. \u201cPerformance-Based Funding for Higher Education: How Well Does Neoliberal Theory Capture Neoliberal Practice?\u201d Higher Education<\/em> 80, no. 3 (December 23, 2019): 457\u201378. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10734-019-00491-4<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Froese, Ian. \u201cManitoba Looks to Tennessee Model in Efforts to Tailor Post-Secondary Education to Labour Market | CBC News.\u201d CBC<\/em>, October 22, 2020. https:\/\/www.cbc.ca\/news\/canada\/manitoba\/manitoba-tennessee-model-higher-learning-performance-based-wfpcbc-cbc-1.5768684<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Government of Alberta. \u201cTransforming Post-Secondary Funding,\u201d January 20, 2020. https:\/\/www.alberta.ca\/release.cfm?xID=67447A51C2BC1-CBF8-78E9-C6759CE8A736486C<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Office of the Provost & Vice President, Academic of Ryerson University. \u201cSMA3: An Overview.\u201d PDF. 2019 Consultation Document, 2019. https:\/\/www.ryerson.ca\/content\/dam\/provost\/PDFs\/Overview-B-24oct2019final.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. \u201cFocus on Outcomes, Centre on Students: Perspectives on Evolving Ontario\u2019s University Funding Model.\u201d Toronto, ON: MTCU, 2015. http:\/\/www.tcu.gov.on.ca\/pepg\/audiences\/universities\/uff\/UniversityFundingFormulaConsultationReport_2015.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOntario\u2019s Postsecondary Education System Performance\/Outcomes Based Funding \u2013 Technical Manual.\u201d Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, September 2019. http:\/\/www.uwindsor.ca\/strategic-mandate-agreement\/sites\/uwindsor.ca.strategic-mandate-agreement\/files\/performance_outcomes-based_funding_technical_manual_-_v1.0_-_final_september_419_en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\nSMA3 and PBF<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
What I concluded<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n